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Abstract— Flight crews and air traffic controllers have reported 
many safety concerns regarding area navigation standard 
terminal arrival routes (RNAV STARs). Specifically, optimized 
profile descents (OPDs). However, our information sources to 
quantify these issues are limited to subjective reporting and time-
consuming case-by-case investigations. This work is a 
preliminary study into the objective performance of instrument 
procedures and provides a framework to track procedural 
concepts and assess design specifications. We created a tool and 
analysis methods for gauging aircraft adherence as it relates to 
RNAV STARs. This information is vital for comprehensive 
understanding of how our air traffic behaves. In this study, we 
mined the performance of 24 major US airports over the 
preceding three years. Overlaying 4D radar track data onto 
RNAV STAR routes provided a comparison between aircraft 
flight paths and the waypoint positions and altitude restrictions. 
NASA Ames Supercomputing resources were utilized to perform 
the data mining and processing. We assessed STARs by lateral 
transition path (full-lateral), vertical restrictions (full-lateral/full-
vertical), and skipped waypoints (skips). In addition, we graphed 
frequencies of aircraft altitudes relative to the altitude 
restrictions. Full-lateral adherence was always greater than Full-
lateral/full- vertical, as it is a subset, but the difference between 
the rates was not consistent. Full-lateral/full-vertical adherence 
medians of the 2016 procedures ranged from 0% in KDEN 
(Denver) to 21% in KMEM (Memphis). Waypoint skips ranged 
from 0% to nearly 100% for specific waypoints. Altitudes 
restrictions were sometimes missed by systematic amounts in 
1,000 ft. increments from the restriction, creating multi-modal 
distributions. Other times, altitude misses looked to be more 
normally distributed around the restriction. This tool may aid in 
providing acceptability metrics as well as risk assessment 
information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Area navigation (RNAV) is a cornerstone of the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) plan for future instrument 
procedures. Between 2009 and 2016, 264 RNAV standard 
terminal arrival routes (STARs) were implemented, and they 
are still continuously increasing [1]. This rapid implementation 
has incurred unforeseen side effects. Major and regional airlines 
 
have both voiced safety concerns about deviations at a NASA 
workshop meeting in November 2015, Boston’s STARs were 
redesigned in 2016 after numerous operational problems, and 
Atlanta was forced to stop using the vertical and speed profiles 
of their newly designed RNAV STARs [2],[3]. Our interest in 
RNAV procedures is pointed specifically towards RNAV 
OPDs and stems from their increased functionality (e.g., 
vertical profiles and speed control) and its resulting 
complexity. To fully understand the operational effects of this 
paradigm change, either from the flight deck or air traffic 
control perspective, we need a source of objective data 
describing operational performance of RNAV procedures. 
That is, a method for comprehensibly capturing and describing 
the adherence trends of instrument procedures. We introduce 
the idea that procedures are important entities in their own right 
and should be treated as the unit of analysis. They are not just 
collections of waypoints, and it is performance along a path 
through a STAR that should be analyzed. By monitoring the 
flightpaths of aircraft, we can understand how STARs are 
functioning in the airspace. Currently no system exists that can 
monitor the adherence of aircraft utilizing RNAV procedures 
in a comprehensive way. 
RNAV STARs are often designed to enhance efficiency and 
regulate throughput. This expands upon the previous intentions 
of instrument procedures: terrain avoidance and standardized 
routing. This expansion of functionality increases complexity, 
particularly, the addition of the speed restricted vertical profile 
for the precision it requires, and the addition of transition routes 
to control specific runway assignments. Vertical profiles add 
variables pertaining to aircraft performance such as drag, idle, 
and auto-flight variability; transitions add rigidity by limiting 
lateral path flexibility.  
A. Purpose 
In order to maintain or reduce the current level of risk we 
need to understand the implications of existing and new 
procedures and our system of controlling air traffic. A possible 
risk with deviating from a STAR is loss of separation leading 
to a midair collision. Complying with a STAR keeps the 
airplane on a known trajectory so it can be protected. Issues 
such as energy management, loss of control, controlled flight 
into terrain, wake turbulence, and weather are also possible 
areas of concern for RNAV STAR adherence. We do not 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170011114 2019-08-31T01:30:55+00:00Z
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understand all of the reasons that lead to non-adherence and 
this deficit in knowledge can increase risk.  
This research is a preliminary overview of adherence trends 
and a demonstration of our data mining methodology to 
further the knowledge of the air traffic system. By looking at 
Instrument procedures as entities, we can investigate the 
design characteristics they embody and observe how our 
current air traffic behaves when guided by those concepts. In 
addition, we can continually monitor our airspace system for 
risk factors to detect changes as they occur. 
B. Background 
First, we needed to understand how to describe the adherence 
of a STAR and which design characteristics and external 
variables might impact flying a procedure. We used the 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) to identify error 
categories, so we could see which variables in the procedures, 
environment, and human operators contribute to operational 
irregularities. We are investigating objective performance, and 
to do this we needed to understand how human error could be 
associated with procedure design and outside influences. Users 
of RNAV procedures are limited to two groups: pilots and air 
traffic controllers. These groups differ in goals and tasks, so we 
needed to investigate them separately. Therefore, we reviewed 
ASRS reports of RNAV procedures from each group’s 
perspective in order to understand the differences. In addition to 
ASRS we reviewed literature on RNAV arrival concepts. Much 
of the previous research was centered on air traffic [5],[6]. 
1) Pilot ASRS Review: We coded 377 ASRS pilot reports 
related to RNAV STARS. We read these reports, then the issue 
or deviation and its reported cause was recorded. Issues mostly 
fell into three categories: altitude, track, and speed deviations. 
Overall, reporting of deviations is known to under-represent 
actual occurrence rates and should be considered here. Speed 
deviations were the least reported issue, most likely because 
they are difficult to detect by ATC. Some of the categories were 
not the sole cause of a problem; therefore, some categories were 
counted more than once for a given report. 
2) Vertical Deviations: Vertical deviations happen when an 
aircraft is not at the altitude expected by ATC. 35% of vertical 
deviations were associated with autopilot and flight 
management system (FMS) confusion. ATC communication, 
vectoring, and STAR modification accounted for 26%. 
Procedure design accounted for 13%, and charting misreads 
accounted for 9%. The remaining 17% were caused by manual 
pilot errors and other unknown reasons. 
One of the most commonly reported ATC interventions was 
runway reassignment (i.e., changing the procedure during its 
use). This requires the flight crews to reprogram the FMS and 
change autopilot modes to maintain the correct flight path. 
Time pressure was often reported as a factor in making FMS 
errors. When procedure design was reported as a cause, 
steepness of the vertical profile, number of restrictions, and 
deceleration requirements were noted as contributory. In 
addition, tailwinds were mentioned for impeding the ability to 
maintain the fixed vertical path with the increased ground 
speed. Charting misreads issues included notes, clutter, and 
electronic interface problems. 
3) Lateral Deviations: Lateral or track deviations occur 
when the airplane departed its expected lateral path and had 
three main causes: ATC intervention, weather avoidance, and 
FMS errors. However, similar to the vertical deviations, the 
groups were not mutually exclusive, and there were many 
reports that initially started with a controller amending a 
previously cleared flight path, followed by the crew making an 
error with the FMS. 
C. Literature Review 
In addition to our ASRS review, we began our literature 
search with another ASRS investigation. Barhydt and Adams 
[2006] reviewed 124 reports to categorize and count incidents. 
They found that four categories accounted for most of the 
reports. These were: ATC procedures, airline operations, 
aircraft systems, and procedure design [4]. 
In addition to ASRS reports, Barhydt and Adams [2006] 
used subject matter experts (SMEs) to uncover RNAV 
procedure usability issues. These pilots and controllers 
explained issues they felt contributed to problems. Issues cited 
were: ATC procedures, flight crew procedures, training, 
clearance discrepancies, aircraft instrumentation, FMS 
databases, and procedure design standards [4]. Many of these 
issues were noted as branches of a high-level issue: workload 
from procedural complexity. 
The constructs of complexity and workload are variable 
between individuals, but performance degradation and flight 
path deviations are sometimes quantifiable. Smith [2005] 
investigated the construct of controller workload. Controller 
human-in-the-loop simulations were used to compare 
traditional ground-based procedures with RNAV STARs 
containing vertical profiles. Dependent variables for the 
construct of workload were: number and content of radio 
communications. Rationale for reducing radio communication 
was to reduce misinterpretation, which can add risk. Therefore, 
the reduction of this information transfer method would be 
beneficial [5]. The results of the study showed a significant 
reduction in communications and their content. However, the 
author noted that workload might not be reduced due to 
monitoring requirements still required by the controller. In 
addition, the reliability of verbal communications compared to 
using a chart to deliver information has not been investigated to 
our knowledge. For risk reduction, subsequent errors rates 
between conditions could be a useful metric. Since the study 
was a simulation of Atlanta airspace, there may be differences 
in other cities. Additionally, weather and pilot deviations could 
increase the level of communications during an RNAV 
procedure and should be understood. Lastly, the author noted 
that passive controller monitoring roles are increased with 
RNAV procedures and could be detrimental to controller 
performance. 
Metzger and Parasuraman [2001] investigated how 
controllers were able to detect conflicts while actively 
controlling, versus passively monitoring traffic. Since a 
procedure is a preplanned set of instructions, they result in the 
controller being a passive monitor of aircraft flying those 
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instructions. RNAV procedures can be in excess of 170 miles 
and may contain numerous “instructions” in the form of altitude 
and speed restrictions. Therefore, the opportunity for non- 
adherence is increased and the controller must monitor more 
parts of the procedure for a longer period of time. During high 
traffic conditions, passive monitoring increased the time it 
took controllers to identify conflicts [6]. If this phenomenon is 
consistent it could result in reactive controller responses versus 
planned and coordinated separation. 
Olson and Olszta [2010] [7] discuss safety in regards 
to TCAS events measured in the terminal airspace. The study 
finds that procedures that are designed to level-off within 
1,000 ft between departures and arrival paths would trigger 
TCAS RA events. In this scenario, the TCAS events were 
occurring in protected space, however, if a flight is not 
adhering to the vertical restrictions of the procedure these 
events would become more serious. From the ASRS review 
vertical non-adherence was reported to be an issue, and when 
coupled with TCAS events becomes a central motivation for 
assessing the vertical adherence.  
In all of these discussed scenarios it is impossible to 
determine the exact cause without reviewing pilot/controller 
voice communications. However, these events highlight the 
need to investigate the performance of the RNAV STARs and 
quantify the occurrence rates where the risk of these events are 
raised. 
II. METHOD 
A. Materials 
The architecture to capture these adherence characteristics 
was built in Python using the Apache Spark large-scale data 
processing framework 1 and deployed at the NASA Advanced 
Supercomputing facility2. The distributed jobs utilized 65 
nodes, each with 2 x 8 core 2.6 GHz processors and 32GB of 
memory. The jobs took approximately 30 mins per airport up to 
2-3 hours for the higher traffic airports. 
Python was used for statistical analysis and plotting. 
Tableau Desktop data visualization software was utilized for 
making different graphs and renderings. 
 
TABLE I List of variables computed or extracted from the data. 
 
                                                      
1  http://spark.apache.org/ 
2 https://www.nas.nasa.gov/hecc/ 
B. Data Sources 
1) Aircraft Flight-track Data: The primary data source 
utilizes recordings of radar tracks from the Center TRACON 
Automation System (CTAS). CTAS is a system used by the 
FAA’s Air Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) facilities and is 
designed to provide controllers with automated tools for 
planning and controlling arrival air traffic [8]. A byproduct of 
the system is the recordings of 4D radar trajectories throughout 
the NAS. For this study 17 of the 20 ARTCC facilities were 
available over three years (2014, 2015, and 2016). The three 
ARTCC facilities not covered were ZID, ZJX, and ZMA. 
Stored data includes time, latitude, longitude, altitude, and 
ground speed and were approximately 1.8TB in size with over 
14 million arrivals landing at 24 airports. 
2) Environmental Data: The NOAA Rapid Refresh (RR) 
data3 were parsed over the same three-year period to capture 
snapshots of winds and temperatures aloft. A subset of these 
measurements was gathered at 1,000 ft. intervals ranging from 
4,000 - 40,000 ft. above each destination airport at a one hour 
sampling rate. This data source was over 2.7TB. 
3) Procedure Data: STAR characteristic data are sourced 
from the Coded Instrument Flight Procedures (CIFP). These 
data include RNAV STAR waypoints (latitude/longitude), 
airspeed restrictions, altitude restrictions, and descent gradient 
(degrees) for each waypoint. Several other derived variables are 
included for further investigative capability in TABLE I. This data 
source was approximately 1.5GB. 
C. Data Processing 
All STAR characteristics were extracted from the CIFP data 
and concatenated into unique transition paths for each input and 
output transition combination (i.e., if there were three input 
transitions and two runway transitions the total unique paths 
created would be 6 for that STAR). See Figure 1 for an 
illustration. The altitude and speed restrictions were extracted 
and linked to each waypoint in the route and stored for each 
transition path. This process was done for each (56 day) chart 
cycle to track changes yielding a comprehensive list of unique 
transition paths across the STARs for all intervals. These paths 
were used to determine whether a flight was following the 
route’s published lateral track. To accomplish this, each flight’s 
trajectory in the CTAS data was compared against each of the 
route’s unique paths. Lateral adherence was defined to be a 
flight that crossed inside a 1.0 nm radius around each waypoint. 
This is in accordance with the RNAV1 requirements of the 
procedures. All other flights that did not have full waypoint 
adherence throughout a transition path were considered not 
fully laterally compliant. Flights that were laterally compliant 
with at least two waypoints on the transition path and 
compliant with the first and last waypoint in the path were 
identified as having skipped waypoints and the skipping 
behavior was analyzed. All other non-laterally compliant 
flights were excluded from this analysis due to the ambiguity 
in the entry and exit points. 
Due to the slower 12-second radar sweep, a flight could fly 
inside the 1.0 nm radius at a waypoint while having its radar hit 
outside of the threshold. To resolve this issue, flight paths were 
up-sampled by linear interpolation to every five seconds 
between samples. Flights were checked against longer 
transition paths first to avoid matching the flight to a shorter 
 
                                                      
3 http://rapidrefresh.noaa.gov/ 
Aircraft Procedure Environment Airport 
• Unix 
Time/Date 
• Aircraft Type 
• Equipment 
Suffix 
• Ground Speed 
(Kts) 
• Altitude (ft) 
• Decent Rate 
(ft/min) 
• Slope to next 
waypoint 
(degrees) 
• Above/Below 
Vertical 
Excursion (ft) 
• Flight Plan 
• Percent Route 
Complete (%) 
• Waypoint 
Name 
• Altitude 
Restrictions 
(ft) 
• Waypoint 
Type (At, 
Window, 
Above, 
Below) 
• STAR Name 
(iteration) 
• High/Low 
Slopes 
between 
waypoints 
(degree) 
• Transition 
Counts 
• Tailwind 
Component 
(Kts) 
• Temperature 
(C) 
•Arrival 
Rates (last 
15 
mins/next 
15 mins) 
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Figure 1. Illustrates the unique transition paths from a STAR. 
 
transition path that may be a subset of a longer one. Once a path 
was found to match with full lateral adherence, a snapshot of 
the waypoint and flight’s features were logged at each waypoint 
crossing. Altitude excursions above or below the RNAV 
defined restrictions for the waypoint ±300 ft. were logged. 
Anything within the published altitude restrictions were 
considered vertically compliant and marked to have a 0 
excursion. The winds aloft at the altitude of the aircraft at the 
waypoint crossing were retrieved from the parsed RR data. 
Using the wind vector and the heading of the flight traveling 
along the published route, the tail wind component was 
computed and logged at each waypoint crossing. Additional 
external factors such as arrival rate at the airport over the last 
15 mins were computed from the CTAS data and logged at each 
waypoint crossing. See TABLE I for a more comprehensive list 
of the parameters captured from the data 
D. Design 
This study was based on archival data mining. The 
originality of the work was in the structured combination of 
data sources included: radar tracks (aircraft), procedure 
characteristics (procedure), weather (environment), and airport 
arrival rates (airport). These data sources were parsed and 
merged together to create a comprehensive set that can be used 
to show trends and insights in the adherence of these 
procedures. 
4) Aggregate Adherence Rates: We used the median to 
describe the central tendency of the adherence distributions due 
to skew; variability of the data was described using 
interquartile range (IQR) of Q1 to Q3 (i.e., 25% either side of 
the median). Yearly aggregate data comprise 365 sample 
proportions rounded to the nearest one percent. Daily samples 
are unique flights of interest for all STARs at the airport 
divided by the total arrival count. Time series data use the 
same method as previously described, but is smoothed using a 
7 day moving average filter. 
5) Skipped Waypoints: Waypoint skip proportions were 
calculated by dividing the number of flights that were counted 
as skipping the waypoint by the total number of flights that 
would have passed by or crossed over the waypoint on a 
transition path. Single waypoints are sometimes part of more 
than one transition. Therefore, they may be listed more than 
once with different proportions. A flight may skip multiple 
waypoints within a transition path, however it must cross at 
least two waypoints in a row and also cross the first and last 
waypoint in the transition path to be included in the tallies. The 
skipped waypoint rates were computed for each waypoint. 
Waypoints on a transition that did not have at least 1,000 
flight crossings, laterally compliant or not, were ignored due 
to low sample size. 
6) Vertical Characteristics: We looked at vertical 
adherence trends only if the flight completed 100% of a lateral 
path for a given transition. It was assumed that the vertical path 
would be advantageous if the flight was laterally compliant. A 
300 ft. error margin was given above and below a restriction 
altitude and flights were counted as “compliant” if within the 
margin. In addition, we used proportions rather than counts to 
normalize for differences in waypoint traffic volume. 
We investigated types of waypoint restrictions and 
categorized them (e.g., at or below) to compare aggregate 
adherence proportions. In addition, we compared the altitudes 
aircraft were crossing the waypoints and created histograms to 
visualize the data. Altitudes were binned in 100 ft. increments 
from the waypoint restriction altitude. 
III. EXAMPLE DATA 
 
A. Full Procedure Adherence Rates 
Overall median adherence of the full-lateral and full- 
vertical profiles (i.e., 100% adherence) for 24 of the most 
heavily-trafficked airports in the data set (see Figure 2). The 
median adherence ranges from 0% in KDEN (Denver) to 24% 
in KMEM (Memphis). In addition, a time series graph of these 
two airports shows the variability of the data as well as the 
differential between full-lateral only and full-lateral/full- 
vertical adherence. These trends can be seen in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4. The vertical tick marks represent the 56 chart cycles 
from 2014-01-01 through 2016-12-31. The rates of adherence 
still vary considerably over time. Since Full-lateral/full- 
vertical is a subset it is less frequent than full-lateral- only. 
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Figure 2. Shows the median adherence percentages for full-lateral and full-
vertical by airport for 2016.
 
Figure 3. Time series of full-lateral and full-later and full-vertical for KMEM. 
 
Figure 4. Time series of full-lateral and full-later and full-vertical for KDEN. 
B. Skipped Transition Waypoints 
Waypoint skips ranged from nearly 0% to nearly 100%. 
Greater than 80% of the waypoints in the data-set had skip rates 
under 20%. Figure 5 shows a histogram of the skip rates across 
the waypoints with more than 1,000 flight samples over the 
three years across the 24 airports. To visualize the skipping 
behavior, we ranked the top 10 most-skipped waypoints along 
with their flight counts and airports served (see Figure 6). We 
chose ODF VOR with 53,796 flights and a skip-rate of 89% to 
visualize on a map. The most frequently used transition path 
that skipped ODF was the MOL.DIRTY3.RW27L route 
(FLCON shares the same transition path). This accounted for 
14,631 out of the 53,796 ODF skipped flights. These flights 
were plotted from a top down view alongside the route’s 
transition and can be seen in Figure 7. By visually inspecting 
the map it would appear the flights are skipping several 
waypoints after AVERY and getting directly routed to DIRTY. 
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Figure 5. Histogram of the skip percentage rates for all waypoints. 
 
Figure 6. The top 10 high skip percentage waypoints with flight counts and 
airport served. 
 
Figure 7. A top-down map of the 14,631 flights that skipped ODF landing at 
KATL on the MOL.DIRTY3.RW27L transition. 
C. Vertical Characteristics 
We looked at the altitudes of aircraft crossing waypoints and 
two different types of distributions were found for at and 
window restrictions. First, we noted that some waypoints had 
somewhat “normal” distributions centered on the waypoint’s 
altitude restriction. Figure 8 shows a histogram of the altitudes 
binned at 100 ft. around the at type waypoint VASHN. The 
region between -300 and 300 represents the range where flights 
are considered compliant with the altitude restrictions and 
have been removed to focus on the excursion behavior. Even 
though some of these waypoints showed some skewing, the 
bulk of the altitudes were clustered around the waypoint 
restriction. Second, we noticed there were waypoints that had 
multi-modal distributions located at 1,000 ft. intervals from 
the waypoint’s restriction. Figure 9 shows the histogram 
binned at 200 ft. below the altitude restriction at the at type 
waypoint JOBEE and illustrates this multi-modal behavior. 
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Figure 8. Histogram of the excursions for VASHN altitude restriction. 
 
Figure 9. Histogram of excursions for JOBEE’s altitude restriction. 
 
1) Waypoint Type: We looked at aggregate data for the four 
types of waypoints: at, ceiling, floor, and window. Nonadherence was greatest for 
waypoints with at altitude restrictions. Aircraft flew below these restriction 
altitudes 16% of the time and 11% above. Floor waypoints (at or above) were the 
second most vertically missed at three percent below. Ceiling (at or below) 
restrictions were missed above at two percent of the time. Window (between) 
restrictions were the most complied with waypoint type with misses either side 
between one and two percent (see Figure 10). 
modal. Multi-modal   distributions   had   modes that often 
occurred in 1,000 ft. increments from the waypoint restriction. 
B. Overall Adherence 
Characterizing adherence rates is useful for understanding 
flexibility in the system versus the procedure. Given the 
immense complexity and quantity of variables associated with 
the usability of a procedure, low adherence numbers may 
indicate variables prohibiting use and rendering the procedures 
unusable. Although, even if utilization is low, aircraft still 
arrive at the airport, indicating human (ATC) intervention. 
Some possible explanations for low adherence could be 
weather, traffic flow rates, ATC policies, procedure design, 
pilot preferences, and controller preferences. 
The NAS currently requires human ATC intervention in 
many areas to function. However, NextGen is moving toward a 
pre-planned procedure-based model that could further reduce 
flexibility in the system. If some of the previously mentioned 
variables reduce adherence levels, it tells us the procedures 
have implicit brittleness. Specific variables that contribute to 
procedural brittleness need to be identified before adding more 
complexity to the procedures. 
C. Adherance Rates Over Time 
It is logical that more precise flight paths (e.g., full- 
vertical/full-lateral) would occur less frequently than less 
precise paths (full-lateral only). As procedures are introduced 
or amended over time, their characteristics may play a role in 
the adherence rates, which can be monitored by this tool. 
Further, the differential between the two measurements could 
indicate changes that were undetectable before and may reveal 
unexpected future impacts on the procedures. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Summary 
We discovered that the adherence rates for full-lateral/full- 
vertical ranged from 0% percent to 24%. Full-lateral/full- 
vertical was generally less frequent that full-lateral only. 
Differences in rates were not always consistent between Full- 
lateral/full-vertical and full-lateral only. Waypoint skip rates 
ranged from nearly 0% to nearly 100%. Greater than 80% of the 
waypoints in the NAS had skip rates below 20%. Vertical 
misses occurred 16% and 11% below and above respectively 
for at waypoints. Window waypoints were missed between 1% 
and 2% of the time. Ceiling waypoints were missed above the 
restriction by 2% and floor waypoints missed below the 
restriction 3% of the time. Distributions of altitude misses 
around waypoints were found to be either normally or multi- 
 
Figure 10. Percent missed below and above the altitude restriction for each 
waypoint type. 
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D. Waypoint Skipping 
Waypoints skipping behavior could be a useful metric in 
judging procedure design. In our ASRS review, being 
removed from a STAR was a primary contributor to deviations 
from assigned parameters. Since the qualifying criteria for a 
skip is to enter a transition and depart a transition, a skip in the 
middle of the procedure would either be a navigation error 
introduced by reprograming the FMS or ATC intervention, 
which could be indicative of a design deficiency. Although 
they have different implications, both are meaningful and 
could expose problematic portions of STARs. 
We noticed a wide disparity in the skip-rates of certain 
waypoints. Rarely skipped waypoints are likely integral to the 
specific airspace in which they reside. Conversely, waypoints 
that are skipped often might be unnecessary or detrimental to 
normal operations. To fully understand these phenomena, 
operational personnel would likely need to be interviewed. 
E. Vertical Adherence 
By comparing different waypoint types, we can possibly 
see how vertical precision relates to adherence. Although we 
were not performing inferential statistics in this study, at 
waypoints appeared to be the least complied with restrictions 
type. This could be related to a greater precision requirement 
to comply. Further investigation should be done without using 
aggregate data due to the variation in performance between 
different STARs and airports. 
By looking further into how aircraft cross specific 
waypoints, the difference between some multi-modal and 
normal distributions gives us insight into the operational 
behavior. Although not completely “normal” these 
distributions may show a natural excursion behavior of aircraft 
at specific waypoints. Alternatively, multi-modal distributions 
might show recurring ATC interventions that are occurring 
systematically. These modes that are situated in 1,000 ft. 
increments could be the result of ATC assignments. It would 
be useful to differentiate the two types and investigate them 
separately 
F. Implications 
This work is a preliminary investigation and a demonstration 
of a unique way to view procedural adherence. By utilizing 
these data, we can see how different airports and ATC 
facilities utilize procedures. In addition, we can see how 
certain intrinsic characteristics of procedures compare against 
each other (e.g., waypoint types). Our ability to mine large 
amounts of data gives us a look at the airspace system at a 
meta-level. 
As our analysis methods progress we can begin to interface 
with operational personnel (e.g., controllers and pilots) and add 
possible explanations to trends found in the data. We believe 
that this cooperative interdisciplinary approach will eventually 
yield the most impact for reducing risk and increasing 
efficiency in designing future procedures. 
G. Limitations 
1) Intent: We realize trying to quantify pilot-intent without 
knowing what ATC instructions were issued could be error 
prone. Flight plans are available and may provide some insight 
into intent from the planning prospective; however, the filed 
plans do not always match with the flown procedure. Given 
this discrepancy we decided that mapping the flight track to 
the procedure would provide a better measure of the procedure 
that was most likely implement. In addition, aircraft that are 
level and not crossing waypoint altitudes as published are likely 
not intending to follow those altitudes. Autopilot modes and 
observed performance could also be a measure of intent that 
would be applicable to our investigation. Exploring ways to 
connect additional information sources to enable greater 
understanding for future experiments would be a necessary step. 
2) Causation: Since our data describe behavior of air traffic 
and are not experimental we cannot   make causal inferences. 
However, we are working to identify relationships between 
variables to attempt prediction of performance.   
3) Measuring Extraneous Variables: This domain is 
complicated and involves several different user groups (e.g., 
pilots and controllers), weather, airplanes, automation, and 
many others variables. Even if relationships between variables 
are strong we will have challenges generalizing the results to 
other geographical areas. In addition, we cannot measure the 
effects of human intervention, which are likely to play a 
significant role in operations. 
H. Future Work 
This work has the potential to support several aspects of 
assessing the RNAV STARs throughout the NAS. One facet is 
to understand the underlying factors that influence adherence 
rates. Better understanding can help with future procedure 
design. A tool to automatically analyze and provide 
visualization capabilities for otherwise unexplored data would 
be a valuable decision support tool and aid the procedure design 
process. 
Another use-case is identifying potential risks in operations. 
This could include analyzing altitude excursions around 
departure and arrival crossings where potential loss of 
separation or other risks could occur. Working with airlines to 
identify other areas of risks would add benefits. 
In expanding the tool, additional metrics can be derived 
from the existing or new features to objectively identify risks 
and efficiency of these arrivals. This may include: 
1. Merging other data sources such as adverse weather 
forecasts/observations to understand the impact they 
have on the arrivals or when a procedure has become 
unusable. 
2. Investigating the correlational relationships between 
variables as they relate to performance, as well as the 
predictability of aircraft paths using objective data. 
3. Leveraging higher sampling rate radar data or and 
ADSB data that may have more reliable coverage and 
precision. 
4. Integrating flight operational quality assurance data 
from the airlines where airspeed, autopilot modes, 
control surfaces, and fuel usage can be used to assess 
the efficiency of the routes and view pilot behavior. 
5. Expanding this investigation to other countries to 
determine if differences in procedural utilization are 
seen.  
I. Conclusion 
We discovered fundamental performance behavior about 
RNAV STARs in this first exploratory study. This suggests our 
method of using procedures as the units of measurement is 
productive. Continuing maturation of this work can help us to 
gain a better understanding of how procedures are performing 
so we can improve future designs, help airlines identify risks, 
and monitor trends for changes in adherence rates. We aim to 
combine a variety of information sources together in order to 
achieve these goals. Further, we plan to quantify some of the 
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factors that add complexity to the air traffic system. We hope 
our work will increase our understanding of the NAS and 
knowledge of this complex system. 
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